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In this paper, we present a new semantic challenge to the
moral error theory. Its first component calls upon moral
error theorists to deliver a deontic semantics that is con-
sistent with the error-theoretic denial of moral truths by
returning the truth-value false to all moral deontic sen-
tences. We call this the ‘consistency challenge’ to the
moral error theory. Its second component demands that
error theorists explain inwhichwaymoral deontic asser-
tions can be seen to differ in meaning despite necessar-
ily sharing the same intension. We call this the ‘triviality
challenge’ to the moral error theory. Error theorists can
either meet the consistency challenge or the triviality
challenge, we argue, but are hard pressed to meet both.
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1 INTRODUCTION
According to moral error theorists, all of our moral assertions are untrue because there is nothing
that could make them true: Since there are no such things as objective moral properties or cate-
gorical reasons, moral error theorists explain, no action is ever morally obligatory, forbidden, or
permissible.1
In this paper, we shall not concern ourselves with the plausibility of error-theoretic arguments
against the existence of moral properties or categorical reasons. Rather, our focus will be firmly
fixed on error theorists’ ability to provide a convincing account of the meaning of deontic moral
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sentences.2 More precisely, we will challenge moral error theorists to deliver a non-trivial seman-
tics of deontic moral sentences that renders all of these sentences false while simultaneously
accounting for their different semantic content. Two observations explain why.
Firstly, given their rejection ofmoral truths, it is clear that error theoristsmust be able to present
a deontic semantics which never returns the truth-value true to any deontic moral sentence. It is
equally clear that for this purpose, error theorists cannot employ mainstream deontic logic and
semantics, as for instance developed by Kratzer (1977, 2012) and Chellas (1980).3 To elaborate, the
family of standard deontic logics and their associated minimal (Chellas, 1980) or neighborhood
(Pacuit, 2017) models, which include Kratzer semantics, Kripke semantics, and most other main-
stream modal semantics as special cases,4 all encode the assumption that permissibility and obli-
gation are logically dual concepts: namely, if ¬𝖯¬𝜑 (¬𝖮¬𝜑) is true, then the positive dual 𝖮𝜑 (𝖯𝜑)
is true, too. They leave no room, therefore, for the error-theoretic thesis that no moral assertion
is ever true. This conclusion is particularly conspicuous with regard to mainstream deontic logics
that accept the dual schema. Importantly, though, it is not limited to semantics which regard 𝖮
and 𝖯 as duals.5 Rather, the point applies to any deontic semantics that treats permissibility and
obligation as distinct but logically related notions. For, so far as a semantics offers distinct but
logically related satisfiability conditions for permissibility and obligation, conditions for univer-
sally falsifying one operator will fail to falsify the other, and thus return the truth-value true to
some deontic moral sentence. Consequently, given their position’s incompatibility with this wide
array ofmainstream and non-mainstream deontic semantics, error theorists owe us an alternative
account for the meaning of deontic moral terms which secures consistency with the error theory
by returning the truth-value false6 to all deontic moral assertions. We call this the ‘consistency
challenge’ to the modal moral error theory.
However, returning the truth-value false to all deontic moral assertions straightforwardly leads
to our second observation. It is well-known that intensional modal semantics assign the same
meaning to any two sentences that share the same truth-value in all circumstances of evaluation
(Speaks, 2018). Consequently, by requiring intensional deontic semantics to assign the truth-value
false to all deontic moral sentences in all possible worlds, the error theory entails that all deontic
moral sentences have the same meaning. Yet, ascribing the same meaning to assertions such as
‘Parents ought to care for their children’ and ‘It is impermissible for the primeminister to mislead
the public’ is just as implausible as holding them to mean the same as ‘2 + 2 = 5’ and ‘Siblings
have different parents’. In order to avoid this result, error theorists thus need to explain how to
account for the different meanings of deontic moral expressions despite their being necessarily
intensionally equivalent. We call this the ‘triviality challenge’ to the modal moral error theory.7
Hence, combine the consistency and the triviality observations, and you arrive at our semantic
challenge to the error theory: In order to provide a convincing account of deonticmoral assertions,
error theorists must not only present a deontic semantics which is compatible with their error-
theoretic denial of moral truths, but also explain in which way moral assertions can be seen to
differ in meaning despite necessarily sharing the same intension.
You might think that meeting the semantic challenge should be easy enough. After all, the
moral error theory appears to be a coherent and conceptually possible metaethical position.
Accordingly, there must surely be some deontic semantics that succeeds in capturing the error-
theoretic thesis. Similarly, if intensional semantics provides insufficient resources to account for
fine-grained meaning, adopting a hyperintensional semantics, which allows for intensionally
equivalent formulas to have distinct semantic content, should certainly do the trick. However,
as we will show in this paper, meeting our semantic challenge to the modal moral error theory is
far from easy.
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Our argument to this effect is two-pronged. Based on a general modal semantics for a basic
modal language (Section 2), wewill first develop a novel way ofmeeting the consistency challenge
on behalf of moral error theorists (Section 3). This proposes that error theorists should analyze
moral assertions in terms of a typed language and introduces a new operator—the ‘XBox’—for the
moral modal fragments of that language.8 Semantically, the XBox works exactly as error theorists
say, namely by mapping all moral assertions to the truth-value false. Moreover, it does so without
having to reject the dual schema or deny that obligation and permissibility are logically related.
Rather, our XBox solution succeeds in securing consistency for the error theory while leaving
mainstream deontic semantics entirely untouched. With this new and very attractive solution
to the consistency problem in hand, we then turn to the triviality challenge and consider how
to generalize our framework to support hyperintensional modalities in order to avoid the XBox
behaving as a triviality operator within intensional semantics (Section 4). However, this will show
that employing hyperintensional modals only comes at the price of no longer being able to meet
the consistency challenge: More precisely, what allows error theorists to address the consistency
challenge is precisely what also prevents them frommeeting the triviality challenge and vice versa.
We conclude, therefore, that far from having an easy way out of our semantic challenge, modal
moral error theorists are in trouble: They can eithermeet the consistency challenge or the triviality
challenge, but are hard pressed to meet both (Section 5).
In what follows, we will focus exclusively on modal moral error theory. As such, we will con-
sider deontic operators, such as ‘ought’ and ‘permissible’, which we will furthermore interpret in
moral terms. However, as will become apparent, nothing in our argument hinges on interpreting
the basic modal operators as the moral deontic operators ‘ought’ and ‘permissible’. Hence, our
arguments can be adapted to any other monadic modal error theory, should another arise. More-
over, to simplify our argument we will treat ‘ought’ and ‘permissible’ as logically dual modal oper-
ators. Yet, our semantic challenge requires only a much weaker assumption, namely that there
is some logical relation between the semantic satisfiability conditions for ‘ought’ statements and
‘permissible’ statements. Finally, we will not examine the meaning of evaluative moral expres-
sions, such as ‘good’, ‘bad’ or ‘desirable’. Accordingly, in order to arrive at a comprehensive assess-
ment of moral error theories’ semantic credentials, our study would need to be supplemented
with an independent inquiry into their ability to provide a convincing semantics of evaluative
terms. Still, given that deontic sentences are generally taken to play a central role in our moral
practices, and bearing in mind that moral error theorists themselves frequently consider deontic
moral assertions when developing their positions, our semantic challenge is a key tool in putting
the error theory’s semantic qualities to the test.
2 MODAL LOGIC PRELIMINARIES
Let us start by laying the foundations for our argument and introduce a general modal semantics
for a basic modal language. Here, we choose a semantics that imposes very minimal constraints,
and is thus able to accommodate practically all standard deonticmodal semantics as special cases.
We develop our argument in this general framework to make clear that, even though there is a
variety of standard semantic accounts available, these do not offer error theorists a way out of our
semantic challenge. Rather, our challenge gathersmomentumnomatterwhich of these semantics
error theorists choose. For example,we briefly discuss inAppendixAhow to cash out in ourmodel
Kripke’s relational semantics and Kratzer’s semantics for graded modals.
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We begin by constructing a basic propositional modal language from a finite set of atomic
propositions, 𝖠𝗍 = {𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑟, …}. This set At contains the non-logical propositional symbols of our
language and will be the signature of our logic. Intuitively, if 𝑝, 𝑞 ∈ 𝖠𝗍, then 𝑝 and 𝑞 are each
formulas of our propositional logicℒ, with signature 𝖠𝗍, and so too are ¬𝑝 and 𝑝 ∧ 𝑞. If we add
a single modal operator, 𝖮, then we have the necessary ingredients for a standard propositional
deontic modal logic. Formally, the well-formed formulas 𝜑 of the basic modal language are given
by the grammar
𝜑 ∶= 𝑝 ∣ ⊥ ∣ ¬𝜙 ∣ 𝜙 ∧ 𝜓 ∣ 𝖮𝜙
where 𝑝 ranges over the set of atomic propositions 𝖠𝗍 and 𝜙 and 𝜓 are arbitrary well-formed
formulas constructed recursively by these rules. The modal language ℒ(𝖠𝗍) is the smallest set
generated by this grammar.
Additional logical connectives are introduced for convenience, such as using 𝜙 → 𝜓 for ¬(𝜙 ∧
¬𝜓) and using 𝜙 ∨ 𝜓 for ¬(¬𝜙 ∧ ¬𝜓). The propositional constant ⊥, called falsum, is useful for
denoting falsehood and is defined by (𝑝 ∧ ¬𝑝), for any 𝑝 ∈ 𝖠𝗍. By convention, the permissibility
operator 𝖯 is defined in terms of the obligation operator, 𝖯𝜙 ∶= ¬𝖮¬𝜙, and 𝖮 is used in deontic
logic in place of the modal box operator□. Hereafter we will freely refer to 𝖮 as a box operator
and 𝖯 as a diamond operator.
Next we turn to the semantics for our modal language ℒ(𝖠𝗍). Our semantic challenge to the
modal moral error theory is a general one, which motivates our choice of neighborhood seman-
tics. One advantage of a general semantic framework is that most if not all mainstream deontic
semantics—for propositional languages, at least—can be reformulated as a specific kind of neigh-
borhood model. This allows us to put technical details that are not relevant for our general argu-
ment safely into the background, although they otherwise are important distinguishing features
of different semantics. If Kratzer and Kripke each have their own neighborhoods, which they do,
then differentiating details of Kratzer and Kripke need not concern us here. As an aside, even
when such technical details are important, having a common semantic framework can help to
make those comparisons clear.
Let 𝑊 be a non-empty set of states or ‘worlds’, as some prefer to call them. A neighborhood
function 𝒩(⋅) is a map from a non-empty set of states𝑊 to a collection of sets of states, 𝒩(𝑤) ∶
𝑊 ↦ ℘(℘(𝑊)), where ℘(𝑊) is the power set of𝑊.9 A neighborhood model, 𝕄 = (𝑊,𝒩,𝑉), is
a tuple, where𝑊 is a non-empty set of states, 𝒩 is a neighborhood function over𝑊, and 𝑉 is a
valuation function which assigns a set of states to each atomic proposition, 𝖠𝗍 ↦ ℘(𝑊).
A formula 𝜑 ∈ ℒ(𝖠𝗍) is true in a state 𝑤 of a neighborhood model𝕄, written ‘𝕄,𝑤 ⊧ 𝜑’, and is
defined by induction on the structure of 𝜑:
1. 𝕄,𝑤 ⊧ 𝑝 iff 𝑤 ∈ 𝑉(𝑝)
2. 𝕄,𝑤 ⊧ ¬𝜑 iff𝕄,𝑤 ̸⊧ 𝜑
3. 𝕄,𝑤 ⊧ 𝜑1 ∧ 𝜑2 iff𝕄,𝑤 ⊧ 𝜑1 and𝕄,𝑤 ⊧ 𝜑2
4. 𝕄,𝑤 ⊧ 𝖮𝜑 iff [[𝜑]]𝕄 ∈ 𝑁(𝑤)
5. 𝕄,𝑤 ⊧ 𝖯𝜑 iff𝑊 − [[𝜑]]𝕄 ∉ 𝑁(𝑤)
where [[𝜑]]𝕄 is the truth set of formula 𝜑 ∈ ℒ(𝖠𝗍) in model 𝕄, that is the set of states in which
𝜑 is true, {𝑤 ∶ 𝕄,𝑤 ⊧ 𝜑}. The truth conditions for 𝖮𝜑 and 𝖯𝜑 are duals (Chellas, 1980, Def. 7.2),
meaning that in our language𝕄,𝑤∗ ⊧ 𝖯𝜑 ↔ ¬𝖮¬𝜑, for all 𝑤∗ in𝑊, and any formula 𝜑 inℒ(𝖠𝗍).
We nevertheless include the satisfiability conditions for both 𝖮 and 𝖯 for convenience.
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While we think there is a lot to recommend switching over to neighborhood semantics, neither
our XBox-based solution to the consistency challenge nor the triviality challenge to the modal
moral error theory depends on it. Each can be configured to run natively on a specific semantics
in the class of neighborhood models.
3 HOW TOMEET THE CONSISTENCY CHALLENGE: THE XBOX
With this general framework ofmodal semantics in hand, let us turn to the consistency challenge,
which requires error theorists to deliver a deontic semantics that is consistent with their denial of
moral truths by returning the truth-value false to all deontic moral sentences. Here, then, is how
we propose that error theorists should meet this challenge.10
Remember that the principal reason for the error theory’s incompatibility with standard deon-
tic semantics lies in the latter’s commitment to the dual schema. To get around this problem, the
heart of our proposal is for error theorists to adopt a two-sorted modal language. Our proposal
is simple: add to the basic modal language ℒ(𝖠𝗍) a new monadic modal operator,⊠, called the
XBox. The XBox is charged with the duty to make all moral modal propositions false. Although
picking outmoralmodal propositions for special semantic treatment is ametalinguistic operation,
introducing a two-sorted language allows the XBox to perform this particular task in the object
language. What differentiates the XBox from ordinary box modalities like 𝖮 is that the grammati-
cal rule for forming XBox formulas is restricted to formulas ofℒ(𝖠𝗍). Informally, this means that
our new modal language with the XBox simply consists of all the formulas of the basic modal
language, ℒ(𝖠𝗍), plus, for each formula 𝜑 in the basic modal language ℒ(𝖠𝗍), a formula of the
form⊠𝜑. Technically, this means that the new language with the XBox is sorted into two types,
and the formation rules of the language are restricted by type. Thus, the well-formed formulas 𝜒
of this new modal language are given by the sorted grammar
𝜑 ∶ 𝑝 ∣ ⊥ ∣ ¬𝜙 ∣ 𝜙 ∨ 𝜓 ∣ 𝖮𝜙
𝜒 ∶ 𝜑 ∣ ⊠𝜑
where 𝑝 ∈ 𝖠𝗍 and the variables 𝜙 and 𝜓 are as before, 𝜑 denotes the formulas of our basic modal
languageℒ(𝖠𝗍), and𝜒 is (effectively) any formula of the basicmodal language alone or prepended
by a single XBox,⊠. Call the smallest language generated by this grammar𝒳ℒ(𝖠𝗍).
The austere rules for constructingXBox formulas resolve the consistency problemwith the dual
schema because there is no dual of the XBox. Although ⊠𝜑 is a well-formed formula schema,
¬⊠ ¬𝜑 is not, nor is ⊠𝜒. Thus, there are no negated XBox formulas, no nested XBoxes inside
other modal operators, and no nested XBoxes inside other XBoxes. XBoxed formulas are not con-
joined to any other formula, either, although this condition could be relaxed. TheXBoxhas a single
syntactic role, namely to prepend any well-formed formula from our original deontic modal lan-
guage.Note, though, that although these construction rules preclude a dual of theXBox, they leave
the dual schema of standard deontic semantics untouched. As such, introducing the XBox allows
us to declare that all moral deontic sentences are false by evaluating both⊠𝖯𝜑 and⊠𝖮𝜑 as false
without having to deny, as Streumer (2017, 124–128) and Olson (2014, 11–15) do, that 𝖯𝜑 ↔ ¬𝖮¬𝜑
and that negated deontic moral sentences such as ¬𝖮𝜑 and ¬𝖯𝜑 are moral. Our proposal thus
renders the maneuvers suggested by Streumer and Olson unnecessary.
Intuitively, the satisfiability conditions for the XBox are very simple as well. Prepending an
XBox to a formula 𝜑 equips error theorists with ‘X-ray vision’ to see inside the formula 𝜑 and
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turn all and only the offending moral modal subformulas within 𝜑 false whilst leaving the truth-
values of all other formulas unaltered. This basic approach allows for some customization. For
example, some error theorists target all normative discourse, sweeping up moral discourse in the
lot, whereas others single out moral discourse specifically and leave other normative language
alone.11 The basic semanticswepresent herewill focus onhow to single outmoralmodal discourse
for special treatment.
While our intuitive description of the semantics sounds simple enough, there is a complication.
Although we refer to modal and non-modal subformulas, this distinction is not reflected directly
by the grammar. Instead, each well-formed formula of the language is built from applying a finite
sequence of our grammatical rules, which can place modal subformulas under negations, within
clauses, or nested under other modalities. The upshot is that a simple rule that replaced each
modal subformula with falsummight flip to verum in the end if they appear under a wider-scope
negation. Fortunately, there is a workaround.
We say that a modal formula is a negated normal form (NNF) if it uses only the logical connec-
tives ∧, ∨, and ¬, and negations only apply to atomic propositions. Additionally, a modal NNF
may have either 𝖮 or 𝖯 operators. Any modal formula can be translated into a logically equivalent
modal NNF by the following equivalences:
1. 𝜙 → 𝜓 ≡ ¬𝜙 ∨ 𝜓 4. ¬¬𝜙 ≡ 𝜙
2. ¬(𝜙 ∧ 𝜓) ≡ ¬𝜙 ∨ ¬𝜓 5. ¬𝖮𝜙 ≡ 𝖯¬𝜙
3. ¬(𝜙 ∨ 𝜓) ≡ ¬𝜙 ∧ ¬𝜓 6. ¬𝖯𝜙 ≡ 𝖮¬𝜙
Intuitively, translating amodal formula into amodal negated normal form is achieved by apply-
ing the above rules to ‘push’ anywide-scope negations that appear in the original formula through
until they attach to atomic propositions. Alternatively, since every well-formed formula is built up
from atomic propositions by applying some finite number of rules of the grammar, the construc-
tion of every formula may be represented by its parse or ancestral tree (Enderton, 2001). The dis-
tinguishing characteristic of a modal NNF parse tree is that negations only appear, if they appear
at all, directly above the leaves of the tree, which consist of atomic propositions.
For any 𝜑 of 𝒳ℒ(𝖠𝗍), suppose ?̃? is a NNF of 𝜑 and ?̃?∗ denotes the formula obtained from the
formula ?̃? by replacing everymodal subformula of either the form𝖮𝜙 or 𝖯𝜙, wherever each occurs
in ?̃?, by the propositional constant ⊥. With this bit of machinery, we introduce the satisfiability
condition for XBox in terms of thismodality-free NNF, ?̃?∗.
7. 𝕄,𝑤 ⊧ ⊠𝜑 if and only if ?̃?∗ is a modality-free NNF of 𝜑 and𝕄,𝑤 ⊧ ?̃?∗
What the XBox satisfiability condition says is that the XBox of 𝜑 is true at state 𝑤 just in case
a negated normal form (?̃?) of 𝜑 whose modal subformulas have all been replaced by falsum (?̃?∗)
is true. So, while syntactically the XBox is a modal operator, semantically it ‘flattens’ any modal
formula 𝜑 it prefixes to a locally satisfiable propositional formula of the form ?̃?∗. In other words,
what is XBoxed at𝑤 is evaluated at𝑤: no other element of the modal base𝑊 is involved. Even so,
since condition (7) is applicable to every𝑤 in𝑊, the XBox faithfully represents the error theorist’s
contention that moral claims are false at all possible worlds.12
The XBox satisfiability condition (7) and the six conditions we presented in Section 2 consti-
tute the general neighborhood semantics for interpreting formulas in the augmented language
𝒳ℒ(𝖠𝗍).
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Example 1. Consider the sentence ‘If Boris has colleagues then Boris is not permitted to disparage
them’, symbolized by 𝜑:
𝑐 → ¬𝖯𝑑
and whose negated normal form is ?̃? ∶= ¬𝑐 ∨ 𝖮¬𝑑 and modal-free negated normal form is ?̃?∗ ∶=
¬𝑐 ∨ ⊥. The table below displays each formula along with its corresponding syntactic parse tree.
Then,⊠(𝑐 → ¬𝖯𝑑) is true at 𝑤 in𝕄 if and only if 𝑐 is false at 𝑤. Thus, the XBoxed assertion that
if Boris has colleagues then Boris is not permitted to disparage them is true just in case Boris does
not have colleagues.
To sum up, then, the XBox is a device for rendering all modal moral formulas within its scope
false, and reducing the truth-conditions of a modal formula to the truth-conditions of its non-
modal, propositional subformulas. If there are no such non-modal subformulas, then the formula
is false. Since we interpret the XBox as a device to model the thesis that all of our moral modal
assertions are false, the error theorist will seek to XBox all of our moral claims, whereas their
opponents will aim to never do so. Each, nevertheless, should be interested in the use of the Xbox.
For, since the XBox is built atop a range of deontic logics interpreted by some or another neigh-
borhood model, our semantics also serves the more general purpose of allowing one to compare
the logical consequences and semantic commitments of moral modal formulas expressed in that
language with an XBox and without. Hence, whilst our proposal might not be the only way in
which the consistency challenge can bemet, we believe that it provides an elegant solution which
is not only extremely general, but also does not require revision of mainstream deontic semantics.
4 THE TRIVIALITY CHALLENGE: LOST DIFFERENCES IN
MEANING
With the XBox, error theorists now have a consistent framework with which to formulate
their view. Pairing the XBox modal language 𝒳ℒ(𝖠𝗍) with neighborhood semantics provides
an extremely general and flexible platform which can accommodate practically all mainstream
semantics for deontic propositional logics.13 Moreover, the consistency challenge to the error the-
ory has been met without having to give up the dual schema of mainstream deontic semantics.
As we have explained above, though, meeting the consistency challenge does not imply that
error theorists are out of the woods just yet. Remember that intensional modal semantics assign
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the same meaning to any two sentences that are intensionally equivalent. Hence, as things
stand, the XBox is not only a straightforward and minimal implementation of error-theoretical
commitments, but also a triviality trap: By assigning the truth-value false to all deontic moral
sentences, XBox semantics leads to the extremely implausible result that all deontic moral
sentences—such as ‘It is impermissible for politicians not to have a Plan B’, ‘Fred ought not to
have lied’, or ‘It is permissible to eat meat’—mean exactly the same. Put differently, then, error
theorists still face the triviality challenge, and thus the task of explaining in which way different
moral deontic assertions can be seen to differ in meaning despite being intensionally equivalent.
The most obvious way to tackle this challenge is to consider leaving intensional semantics
behind by connecting the XBox to a hyperintensional semantics. Unlike intensional semantics,
hyperintensional semantics are designed to account for different meanings of sentences that have
the same intension. Just as was the case with regard to standard deontic semantics, there is also
a considerable variety of hyperintensional semantics on offer. Historically, these are often heavily
involved in the philosophical debate about the metaphysics of propositions, and thus tie their for-
mal proposals to philosophical positions about which properties of intensional semantics ought
to be weakened or abandoned altogether. For instance, some approaches to hyperintensional con-
texts propose extending the range of states that are semantically admissible to include impossible
worlds alongside possible worlds.14 Others propose to count how a proposition is syntactically
represented as part of the semantic meaning of a formula, either to represent reasons for assert-
ing the formula or to account for the resources required to verify it.15 Another approach takes the
semantic content of a formula to be something other than a set of states in which that formula is
true, either by focusing on Russellian propositions or some other structured objects.16
However, there is a problem. For, despite their generality, neighborhoodmodels and their asso-
ciated modal logics do not support hyperintensional modalities. In fact, the only non-negotiable
modal inference rule that is valid with respect to every neighborhood model is a rule stating that
logically equivalent formulas are equally obligatory.17 Put differently, while the flexibility of neigh-
borhood semantics might lull us into believing that anything goes for modal operators, intension-
ality is non-negotiable.
Fortunately, though, Igor Sedlár has recently provided us with a way around this problem by
extending neighborhood semantics in a manner that supports hyperintensional modals (Sedlár,
2019). More precisely, he introduces a generalization of neighborhood models and proves com-
pleteness results for a large family of hyperintensional monadic modal logics supported by his
models. His framework features a set of semantic contents that are assigned to formulas and asso-
ciated with states, with neighborhood models appearing as a special case when those semantic
states are identical to the power set of the set of worlds used in our specification of neighbor-
hood models above. The details of Sedlár’s framework can be set aside here. Instead, what makes
his framework particularly attractive for our purposes is its great generality, in that his family
of hyperintensional modal logics is constructed without a need to pick a side in the philosophi-
cal debate about the metaphysics of propositions. Instead, his framework is neutral towards the
different hyperintensional semantics currently on offer, in that he shows how each position’s com-
mitments can be faithfully expressedwithin his formalism.As such, Sedlár’s framework for hyper-
intensional modal logics is similar in spirit to our proposal for the XBox: each is very general in
scope, if not the most general account of its kind currently available.
Sedlár thus presents a very appealing approach to hyperintensional modals in response to the
triviality challenge. Unfortunately for error theorists, though, they cannot employ it. The reason
why is very simple: The price of using Sedlár’s very general hyperintensional semantics in order to
work out an account of moral modalities that renders them false but non-equivalent in meaning
TIEFENSEE andWHEELER 9
is to accept that any hyperintensional model for an XBox will, necessarily, also be a model for an
‘XDiamond’ defined as ¬⊠ ¬𝜑. In fact, the logic of all hyperintensional monadic modal logics is
simply classical propositional logic augmented by the dual schema (Sedlár, 2019, Theorem 1). So, if
the XBox were to be upgraded to a monadic hyperintensional modal in order to meet the triviality
challenge, then therewould also be a hyperintensional XDiamond. In a nutshell, Sedlár’smonadic
hyperintensional modal logic would require that both⊠𝜑 and ¬⊠ ¬𝜑 are well-formed formulas.
However, recall that in order to meet the consistency challenge and resolve the error theory’s
incompatibility with standard deontic semantics, the grammatical rules for constructing XBox
formulas explicitly prohibit a dual of the Xbox: that is, ¬⊠ ¬𝜑 is not a well-formed formula of
𝒳ℒ(𝖠𝗍). Accordingly, what allows error theorists to address the consistency challenge—namely,
the assumption that the XBox is without a dual—is precisely what prevents them from meeting
the triviality challenge through a hyperintensional modal semantics.
5 A SEMANTIC DILEMMA FOR THEMORAL ERROR THEORY
Let us recap. We confronted the error theory with the semantic challenge to deliver a deontic
semantics that renders all deontic moral sentences false—what we have called the ‘consistency
challenge’—while accounting for the fact that deontic moral assertions differ in meaning—what
we have called the ‘triviality challenge’. We demonstrated how to meet the consistency challenge
by introducing the XBox operator, which achieves compatibility between the error theory and
deontic semantics in very simple and general terms.
At the same time, based on Sedlár’s very general framework for hyperintenstional modalities,
we showed thatmeeting the consistency challengewithinmainstreammodal semantics precludes
meeting the triviality challenge and vice versa: TheXBox prohibits a dual, while a hyperintensional
XBox would go through only if a dual in the form of an XDiamond were admitted. As a result, our
semantic challenge turns into a semantic dilemma for the error theory: Either, the moral error
theory can be consistently formulated, but entails the meaning-equivalence of all deontic moral
assertions. Or it can account for the different meanings of deontic moral assertions, but is now
straightforwardly inconsistent. Either way, the modal moral error theory is in trouble.
To be clear, in this paper we have not provided an impossibility result. That is, we have not
shown that it is impossible for modal moral error theorists to rise to our semantic challenge by
finding a way out of this dilemma. However, let us close by stressing just how difficult a task this
turns out to be.
For instance, as was pointed out earlier, it would be a mistake to think that the semantic
dilemma is driven by the dual schema, such that abandoning this schema by appealing to a tra-
dition in deontic logic that rejects treating 𝖮 and 𝖯 as duals will stop our challenge in its tracks.
Firstly, remember that our XBox-based solution to the consistency challenge does not even require
giving up the dual schema in mainstream deontic semantics. Rather, the XBox succeeds in secur-
ing consistency for the moral error theory while accepting that 𝖮 and 𝖯 are modal duals. Accord-
ingly, it is not the dual schema of mainstream deontic semantics that generates the semantic
dilemma, but rather the observation that any hyperintensional operator requires a dual.
Secondly, even if moral error theorists sought refuge in non-standard deontic semantics, it is
not a given that these semantics are compatible with the error theory. For instance, one such
approach in this tradition attempts to reduce deontic modals to standard, alethic modal logic by
taking 𝖮𝜑 to express the conditional □(𝐺 → 𝜑), which says that you are obligated to 𝜑 just in
case it is necessarily the case that every state that is good (𝐺) is one in which 𝜑 is satisfied, and
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defining 𝖯𝜑 as □(𝜑 → 𝐺), which says that it is necessary that either 𝜑 is not satisfied in a state
or that state is good (van Benthem, 1979). Yet, while this reductionist strategy may appear to offer
an escape route from our consistency challenge, it is not open to the error theorist. For, note that
the formula□(𝐺 → 𝜑) is false at a state 𝑤 just in case every neighborhood𝑁(𝑤) is such that 𝐺 is
true but 𝜑 is false, which would commit the error theorist to claiming that there are morally good
states—a claim she is committed as an error theorist to reject.
Thirdly, while there are other proposals in this tradition that an error theorist might want to
consider, let us stress oncemore that the aimof all of these non-standard deontic logics is to specify
how 𝖮 and 𝖯 are logically related to one another, and not to deny that they are logically related.
As long as the satisfiability conditions for permissibility and obligation remain logically related,
though, it will always be the case that the falsity of some deontic sentence will entail the truth
of another. As a result, our consistency challenge simply resurfaces. Consequently, although we
have appealed to the dual schema when setting up the consistency challenge, our point does not
depend on it. Instead, our semantic challenge should be viewed as a template that can be adapted
to a wide range of deontic semantics, including those that reject that obligation and permissibility
are modal duals. Hence, denying that 𝖮 and 𝖯 are modal duals is neither necessary nor sufficient
to dissolve the semantic dilemma.
Finally, could moral error theorists seek to react to our challenge by going one step further,
namely by denying that the satisfiability conditions for 𝖮 and 𝖯 are logically related at all?18 Note
thatmerely issuing such a denial is not sufficient formeeting our semantic challenge. Rather, error
theorists need to present a plausible deontic semantics that severs all logical relations between 𝖮
and 𝖯, successfully secures consistency for the error theory and avoids the triviality challenge.
Since we know of no deontic semantics that meets these objectives and treats modal operators as
logically independent, we would be curious to see one.
Alternatively, could moral error theorists respond to the generality and comprehensiveness of
our semantic challenge not by seeking different interpretations of 𝖮 and 𝖯, but by denying that
obligation and permissibility should be treated as modal operators in the first place? That is, could
they introduce a bifurcation in the treatment of notions such as necessity and possibility on the one
hand and obligation and permissibility on the other, such that the former are taken to function as
modal operators, whereas the latter are not?
Firstly, note that this maneuver would not come with a built-in guarantee to succeed as a
response to our semantic challenge. Rather, moral error theorists would still have to demonstrate
how such a non-modal semantics of obligation and permissibility is both compatible with the error
theory and able to account for the different semantic content of moral assertions. Secondly, treat-
ing ought and permissible as discontinuouswithmodals such asmust andmightwould amount to a
radical departure from the established approach to deontic notions that is shared across logic, lin-
guistics, andmetaethics alike. Accordingly, if error theorists felt forced to adopt such a bifurcatory
strategy in response to our semantic challenge, this would be a very significant result in itself. So
far,moral error theorists have assumed, at least implicitly, that they can employ the same semantic
account as other representationalists. Now, though, it would be apparent that unlike other rep-
resentationalists, error theorists cannot adopt a unified approach to obligation, permissibility and
other modals, but instead require a non-standard, non-modal semantics of moral deontic expres-
sions tailor-made for the error theory. Such a non-modal approach would, moreover, come with
its own severe problems, ranging from questions in compositional semantics, to the interpretation
and unifying explanation of ought andmust together with their different flavors, to the plausibility
of potential definitions of ought and permissible in terms of reasons or value, say.19 Hence, besides
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having to deal with the semantic challenge presented here, opting for bifurcation would burden
error theorists with the additional demand of having to address the numerous objections faced by
non-modal approaches to obligation and permissibility.
Finally, assume that moral error theorists chose to react to our semantic challenge not by trying
to meet it head-on, but by undermining it. More precisely, imagine that they attempted to turn
tables by declaring that if deontic semantics is not compatible with the moral error theory, so
much the worse for deontic semantics. After all, the moral error theory is clearly conceivable and
conceptually possible. Our semantic challenge, in turn, seeks to rule out this theory by semantic
fiat, and thus tries to pull a ‘metaphysical rabbit’ out of a ‘semantic hat’ (Loeb, 2008) by deriv-
ing metaphysical conclusions from semantic premises alone. Yet, any such endeavor is clearly
hopeless. Hence, our semantic challenge collapses, or so the error theorist now argues.
It is correct that if the modal moral error theory could not meet our challenge and thus had
to be rejected on semantic grounds, it would follow conceptually that at least one moral claim is
true. And indeed, this might be a surprising result. Still, we should not dismiss it out of hand.
Firstly, note that this result would not necessarily entail robustly metaphysical implications
about moral reality. For, truth-conditional deontic semantics is arguably also compatible with
positions such as metasemantic expressivism and inferentialism, and thus views which reject the
existence of robustly metaphysical moral facts and properties whilst accepting the existence of
moral truths.20 Hence, even if our semantic arguments led to the result that it is conceptually
true that not all moral claims are false, this would not conjure into existence any metaphysical
‘rabbits’ in the form of metaphysically robust moral reasons and properties. Secondly, note that
despite being surprising, this result might not be as troubling as it might seem at first sight. For
instance, from our treatment of the necessity and possibility operators, □ and ◊, it also follows
that it is conceptually true that some modal claim is true. Yet, we do not appear to be overly con-
cerned about this finding. Moreover, instead of having to accept these results as brute and unex-
plainable semantic facts, it might well be the case that at least certain accounts of normative and
non-normative modals will be able to explain why these conceptual truths hold, say by appealing
to the specific function that modal terms play within our language and practices.
Finally, and most importantly, note that our semantic challenge to the moral error theory does
not seek to end metaethical debate by semantic fiat. Rather, it should be understood as exactly
that: a challenge to back up the claim that the error-theoretic position is both consistent and
semantically plausible. After all, the fact that a position seems to be coherent does not entail that
it is coherent. Accordingly, in order to meet our challenge, it is not sufficient merely to declare
that the moral error theory is consistent and conceptually possible. Rather, error theorists must
demonstrate their position to be so by presenting a semantics which is both compatible with their
position and able to account for the different semantic contents of deontic sentences. As such,
the onus of developing a semantics for their theory that can escape our semantic dilemma is
squarely on error theorists. Unless they have discharged this task, there is no reason to trust that
themodalmoral error theory canprovide a coherent and semantically plausible account of deontic
moral language.
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ENDNOTES
1 There are different versions of the error theory. Some reject the existence of moral properties on conceptual
grounds (Loeb, 2008; Streumer, 2017), others deny their existence on the basis of metaphysical considerations
such as metaphysical queerness (Joyce, 2001; Mackie, 1977; Olson, 2014). Some error theorists take moral claims
to conceptually entail that moral properties or categorical reasons exist (Joyce, 2001; Mackie, 1977; Olson, 2014),
others understand moral language’s commitment to moral facts in terms of semantic or pragmatic presupposi-
tion (Kalf, 2018). None of these differencesmatter for our purposes. The only distinction that is of some relevance
to our arguments is that between what we can call the ‘necessary’ and the ‘contingent’ error theory (for a related
discussion, seeOlson, 2014, p.12, fn.17).We can understand the former as holding thatmoral claims are necessar-
ily untrue, and thus untrue in all possible worlds. The latter, in turn, can be understood as submitting that whilst
moral claims are untrue in the actual world and relevantly similar worlds, they might be true in others (Brown,
2013; Kalf, 2015). In what follows, we develop our semantic challenge in relation to the necessary moral error
theory. However, in Section 3, footnote 12, we explain in which way a variant of our challenge also applies to the
contingent moral error theory. Accordingly, adopting the error theory’s contingent version does not provide an
obvious way out of our semantic challenge.
2 Moral error theorists, who are representationalists about moral language, have recently made limited forays
into semantics by propounding specific theses about the absence of conceptual entailment relations between
deontic terms such as ‘wrong’ and ‘permissible’ in an attempt to secure consistency for their position (Olson,
2014, 11–15; Pigden, 2007, 450–454; Streumer, 2017, 124–128). At the same time, they have not as yet provided
a general semantics of deontic notions that would systematically specify how the meaning of these terms is to
be understood.
3 For a related argument, see also (Tiefensee, 2020).
4 AppendixA includes some brief remarks about simulatingKripke’s relational semantics andKratzer’s semantics
for graded modalities within neighborhood models.
5 Some error theorists, such as Streumer (2017) and Olson (2014), reject the dual schema by denying that 𝖮𝜑 (𝖯𝜑)
conceptually follows from ¬𝖯¬𝜑 (¬𝖮¬𝜑). Similarly, there is a tradition in deontic logic that denies the dual
schema (see, for example, van Benthem (1979)). As we explain here, though, just as the consistency challenge
does not depend on acceptance of the dual schema, our response to this challenge does not require its rejection.
6 It might be argued that we should not adopt the error theory’s standard formulation, according to which all
moral assertions are false, but its non-standard formulation, according to which moral assertions are neither
true nor false (Kalf, 2018). Yet, since mainstream deontic semantics is based on classical logic and thus does not
cater for truth-value gaps, it should be obvious that the non-standard formulation of the error theory is no more
compatible with mainstream deontic semantics than its standard formulation. Simulating the departure from
bivalence within somemulti-modal system in order to capture the non-standard formulation of the error theory,
in turn, encounters serious limitations (Wheeler & Alberti, 2011). Accordingly, adopting the error theory’s non-
standard formulation in response to our semantic challenge is not an avenue thatwewould advise error theorists
to pursue. As such, we will follow the standard formulation here by understanding the error theory as holding
all moral assertions to be false. For different formulations of the error theory, see Olson (2014, 11–15).
7 It might be suggested that this problem also applies to all non-error-theoretic representationalists who hold that
certain true (false) moral claims are necessarily true (false), such that error theorists could simply latch on to
whichever solution these other representationalists may provide to this problem. However, non-error-theoretic
representationalists and error theorists do not face the same semantic challenge, nor can they offer the same
solution to their respective challenges, exactly because the former but not the latter hold that there are nec-
essarily true as well as necessarily false moral claims. As such, our triviality challenge for the error theory is
separate from observations about the familiar incapacity of intensional semantics to differentiate, semantically,
among propositions that are necessarily true and those that are necessarily false, respectively. For, whilst this
incapacity can arguably be addressed by non-error-theoretic representationalists through turning to hyperinten-
sional semantics, we shall argue that for principled reasons, the error theorist cannot avail herself of any existing
hyperintensional semantics in her response to the triviality challenge exactly because of her error-theoretic com-
mitment to the thesis that all moral assertions are necessarily false. We thank an anonymous referee for Noûs
for asking us to render this more explicit.
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8 It might be hoped that rather than having to introduce new operators within our semantics, a little tweak to
mainstream deontic semantics will suffice for error theorists to meet the consistency challenge. Why this hope
is frustrated is explained in (Tiefensee, 2020).
9 Neighborhood models, proposed by Scott (1970) as a generalization of Kripke’s relational semantics, have been
applied to deontic logic and the logic of conditionals (Chellas, 1980), games (Parikh, 1985), alternating time
(Alur et al., 1992), epistemic modals (Kyburg & Teng, 2001), and coalitions (Pauly, 2002), among others. For a
contemporary introduction to neighborhood semantics, see Pacuit (2017).
10 One may view our proposal as a positive general framework for error theorists which imposes minimal con-
straints on theory construction. That we later use this generality to widen the scope of our triviality argument
against moral error theories is a separate issue.
11 For a general normative error theory, see Streumer (2017). For error theories restricted to moral discourse, see
Mackie (1977), Olson (2014), and Joyce (2001).
12 In footnote 1, we distinguished between necessary and contingent versions of the moral error theory and have
so far focused on the former. Why a variant of our semantic challenge also applies to the contingent error theory
becomes apparent once we ask which deontic semantics contingent error theorists could employ to deliver their
desired result, namely that all sentences of the from 𝖮𝜑 and 𝖯𝜑 are false at the ‘actual’ and relevantly similar
worlds but true at others. Mainstream deontic semantics clearly do not fit this bill. Nor does our XBox. For
instance, in order to allow moral claims to be ‘contingently’ true in some states but false in others, one might
modify (7) by restricting the applicability of (7) to a proper subset of the modal base,𝑊. However, this simple
proposal makes the satisfiability conditions of a formula depend on the state in which that formula is evaluated,
which is not how modal logic works. For, although the interpretation of modal formulas proceeds in terms of
relationships among states in𝑊, the syntax of modal logic does not reference states. Hence, there is no way for a
modal language to refer to states to determinewhether or not amodal formula is to beXBoxed.Next, the standard
method to address this inability to denote states of amodel is hybridmodal logic (Areces& tenCate, 2007), which
adds a set of atomic names to amodal language that denote states and a newmodal operator that applies to those
names of states. However, hybrid modal logics are proper extensions of modal logics, so they validate the dual
schema. More importantly still, hybrid modal languages are constructed to express whether or not a formula
is evaluated at a particular state, which at minimum requires contingent error theorist to adopt a language
expanded to include negated XBox formulas, thus exposing the contingent error theorist to the consistency
problem anew. Hence, contingent error theorists run into problems with regard to consistency in combination
with contingency for the very same reason that explains why necessary error theorists run into trouble with
regard to consistency in combination with triviality: Necessary error theorists’ attempt to address the triviality
challenge presupposes precisely what meeting the consistency challenge precludes, or so we argue. We can now
see that contingent error theorists’ attempt to secure contingency for their position also presupposes precisely
what meeting the consistency challenge precludes. Both times, the assumption being presupposed is that the
XBox allows for negation. In addition, we can foresee that certain ways to secure contingency—such as the
attempt to restrict the modal base to which the XBox applies to a specific set of states—will re-generate the
triviality challenge even for the contingent error theory. Still, let us stress thatwhilewe think that these problems
are serious, we are not claiming to have shown here that it is impossible to develop a deontic semantics that
simultaneously (a) caters for contingency, (b) returns the truth-value false to all deontic moral claims in the
actual and relevantly similar worlds, and (c) does so in a way that accounts formoral claims’ differentmeanings.
However, what these brief considerations do show is that adopting a contingent error theory does not provide
an obvious way out of our challenge. Rather, if error theorists chose to turn to the contingent error theory in
response to our semantic challenge—whichwould be a very significant result in itself, given that doing sowould
rule out prominent error-theoretic positions and arguments—the onus would be firmly on them to spell out a
deontic semantics that successfullymeets (a)–(c).We thank a referee for this journal for pressing us on this point.
13 Indeed, it arguably provides themost general platform currently on offer. At the very least, neighborhood seman-
tics cover the two most popular intensional semantics for deontic modals.
14 Examples include Hintikka (1975), Barwise and Perry (1983) and Jago (2015).
15 Examples include Fagin and Halpern (1988), Artemov (2008) and Wheeler (2018).
16 See for instance Lewis (1970), Soames (1987) and King (2007).
17 This rule is called RE and says that if 𝜙 ↔ 𝜓 is a theorem, then 𝖮𝜙 ↔ 𝖮𝜓 is a theorem, when 𝖮 is a box modal.
See Chellas (1980).
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18 For this strategy, compare Pidgen’s (2007), Olson’s (2014), and Streumer’s (2017) considerations on conceptual
entailment relations.
19 See Chrisman (2016), chapter 2 for an assessment of non-modal interpretations of obligation and permissibility
and a strong defence of the modal approach to deontic notions.
20 For truth-conditional semantics’ combination with metasemantic expressivism and inferentialism, see (Chris-
man, 2016; Köhler, 2018; Ridge, 2014; Schroeter & Schroeter, 2018; Silk, 2013).
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APPENDIX A: FINDING NEIGHBORHOODS FOR KRIPKE AND KRATZER
Kripke’s relational semantics for normalmodal logic (Kripke, 1963) remains the best knownmodal
semantics. A standardKripkemodel for the basicmodal languageℒ(𝖠𝗍) is a triple,ℳ = (𝑊,𝑅, 𝑉),
where𝑊 is a non-empty set of states and 𝑉 is a valuation function which assigns a set of states to
each atomic proposition, 𝖠𝗍 ↦ ℘(𝑊), and 𝑅 is a binary relation on𝑊 (i.e., 𝑅 ⊆ 𝑊 ×𝑊).
Briefly, a binary relation on𝑊 can be understood as a particular kind of neighborhood function,
namely one that satisfies the properties of ‘R-necessity’ (Pacuit, 2017, Definition 2.8). In addition
to Pacuit’s discussion of how to simulate Kripkemodels within a neighborhoodmodel, we recom-
mend Hansen’s study of monotonic modal logics and the associated class of supplemented neigh-
borhood models (Hansen, 2003). Monotonic modal logics reside in a Goldilocks zone between
fully classical modal logics, which are the most general but weakest monadic modal logics, and
themore restrictive normalmodal logics and their associatedKripke relationalmodels.Monotone
modal logics have nice logical properties, but are more flexible than Kripke-style normal modal
logics. Unlike normalmodal logic, for instance, monotonemodal logics allow formoral dilemmas
(Goble, 2005): it is not a theoremofmonotonemodal logics that a conjunction of obligations imply
an obligation to all the conjuncts. Also, their semantics, the class of supplemented neighborhood
models,𝕄𝑠, afford very elegant and intuitive satisfiability conditions for box and diamondmodals,
respectively:
5𝑠. 𝕄𝑠,𝑤 ⊧ 𝖮𝜑 iff (∃𝑋 ∈ 𝒩(𝑤), ∀𝑣 ∈ 𝑋) ∶ 𝕄𝑠, 𝑣 ⊧ 𝜑
6𝑠. 𝕄𝑠,𝑤 ⊧ 𝖯𝜑 iff (∀𝑋 ∈ 𝒩(𝑤), ∃𝑣 ∈ 𝑋) ∶ 𝕄𝑠, 𝑣 ⊧ 𝜑
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Informally, condition (5𝑠) says that 𝖮𝜑 is satisfied just in case there is some set of states 𝑋 in the
neighborhood such that every state in 𝑋 satisfies 𝜑, whereas (6𝑠) says that 𝖯𝜑 is satisfied just in
case every set 𝑋 in the neighborhood is one that has at least one state where 𝜑 is satisfied.
§
Kratzer’s semantics presents a few complications, but only because there are some clarifications
that need to be made before embarking on locating the right neighborhood.
Kratzer has proposed a two-dimensional semantics to account for the role that a conversational
background plays in determining the meaning of modal particles in natural language (Kratzer,
2012). A conversational background specifies a context, which is represented in the semantics by
a state-dependent set of propositions determined by a function from every state𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 to a subset
of the power set of𝑊. Kratzer’s semantics features two such state-dependent functions. The first
picks out the relevant states to use to evaluate a modal formula, much as a standard Kripkemodel
does. The other function, whichKratzer calls an ordering source, imposes an ordering on the states
selected by the first function. Whether this too can be captured within a standard Kripke model
depends on some details we will return to in a moment. The reason for imposing an ordering
on states is to allow the semantics to handle graded modalities, thereby providing satisfiability
conditions for comparative modal claims such as ‘𝜙 is better than 𝜓’ or ‘𝜙 is more likely than 𝜓’.
Call this scheme a two-contextmodel.
There are a variety of ways to flesh out the formal semantics of a two-context model, depend-
ing on the properties you impose on each function. Unfortunately, there is some disagreement
over what precisely Kratzer’s two-context model is committed to. One source of confusion is
due to David Lewis’s misuse of the term ‘partial order’ (reflexive, antisymmetric, transitive) to
refer to a preorder (reflexive, transitive) (Lewis, 1981, p. 220), which Kratzer regrettably follows
(Kratzer, 1991, p. 644). When an ordering source is partially ordered, and there is a minimal state
in the ordering source, then there are equivalent augmented neighborhood models (Arló-Costa
& Taysom, 2005, Theorems 2 & 3). So, when the ordering is partial and has a bottom element,
there is a Kripke model for this class of two-context models, too. If there is no minimal state in a
partially ordered ordering source, then Kratzer semantics is equivalent to supplemented models
closed under finite intersection and containing the unit (i.e., a filter) (Arló-Costa & Taysom, 2005,
Theorems 4).
A second source of confusion is due to Kratzer’s apparent focus on classes of neighborhoods
that satisfy the properties of a filter. Although this class of models is slightly more general than
Kripke models can capture, arguably they are not general enough. For when the domain of states
𝑊 is finite, there are counterpart Kripke models. Moreover, a consequence of Kratzer’s defini-
tion is that the range of the first function—which selects the set of states to be ordered—is a
non-empty set. Yet, many of the natural language examples used to motivate her semantics do
not have this feature. Thus, although the class of supplemented neighborhood models standing
behindKratzer’s semantics ismore general than standard Kripkemodels, focusing onmodels that
satisfy the properties of filters is not general enough, for thosemodels are ill-suited to representing
deontic modals due to them all being closed under finite intersection and validating schema (C),
𝖮𝜙 ∧ 𝖮𝜓 → 𝖮(𝜙 ∧ 𝜓). In otherwords, within this class ofmodels it is a theorem that a conjunction
of obligations implies an obligation to all the conjuncts.
Rather than explore corresponding neighborhood models for variants of Kratzer’s two-context
semantics, one can instead begin to separate the role that ordering plays in the semantics from the
role that a selection function plays for determining which states are to be used in the satisfiability
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conditions. (Arló-Costa & Taysom, 2005), for example, introduces machinery from conditional
logics and belief revision to add more sophisticated selection operations to model the semantics
of conditional, comparative modal sentences. The upshot is that neighborhood semantics can
capture the core features of Kratzer’s two-context semantics while allowing us to go well beyond
Kratzer’s arbitrarily restrictive construction.
